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What happened?
On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident
occured at the Tokai nuclear fuel plant in
Japan. The plant, operated by lCO Co. Ltd., a
100% subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining
Co. Ltd., converts enriched uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (U02)
for use in nuclear fuel. Criticality accidents
involve a self-sustaining chain reaction
caused from handling of too large amounts of
enriched uranium. The chain reaction
continued for around 20 hours, before it
could be stopped.
The uranium processed was enriched to
18.8% of uranium-235, rather than the 3-5%
used for commercial light water reactor fuel.
Material of this high enrichment grade was
being produced for the experimental loyo
Fast Breeder reactor.
The plant has an annual production capacity
of 715 tonnes of uranium for light water
reactors, and 3 tOIlI1eSof uranium for fast
breeder reactors.
The conversion process used in the Tokai
plant is a wet chemical process: The uranium
oxide (U30g) obtained in a first processing
step (in the form of a powder) is dissolved in
nitric acid (HN03). The resulting uranyl
nitrate solution or slurry (U02(N03)2) is
pumped into a buffer tank. Then, the liquid is
pumped into a precipitation tank, where
anunonia (NH3) is added to precipitate
anunonium diuranate (~)2U207 ("ADU").
The amount of uranium contained in this tank
must be strictly controlled to avoid criticality.
These controls however failed, and 16 kg
instead of the permitted 2.4 kg were poured
into the tank. About 6 kg were already
sufficient to initiate a criticality under these
circumstances.
In dry systems, criticality accidents often
are quenched by various inherent effects,
terminating the chain reaction
automatically. In solution criticality
accidents such as in Tokai however, the
chain reaction may continue for some time
after the first high peak and typically is
followed by fissions of oscillating
intensity, see til(' following graph:
.,..
."" r,KtfiEf,1oi.;Roi_._",..---
10"
I
t~O Of
SOlunow
ADDITION
>:I
ri'
101'
ri.1
~b 'A c.b ~ ~ I:~ &0 I:' Jo ri. ~
TlfJE -SIC
,If\ln 1. . U••",. hh u4 htt'lnh4 rl••1oa 1"~r9'
~e1•••• La cu,C' U II I. '''14th. of '1••
(from McLaughlin_1991)
The Tokai precipitation tank was
equipped with a water-filled cooling jacket.
After the chain reaction was initiated, this
water possibly' contributed to the effect that
the reaction did not stop automatically after
the first peak. Water is a good reflector and
moderator to slow down neutrons for they
can initiate further fissions of uranium-235
atoms. The chain reaction only stopped,
after this water had been drained and boron
(a neutron absorber) had been added. Based
on the results from analyzing the sample
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solution taken form the precipitation basin on
October 20, 1999, the STA assumes that the
entire nuclear fission number resulting from
the criticality reaction is 2.5 &middot; 1018,
and the weight of uranium-235 that
underwent fission was about 1 mg. Nearly
half of the total fissions (1.2 &middot; 1018)
apparently occured during the first 25 minutes
of the criticality. The total energy generated
during the criticality event was estimated to
have been about 22.5 kWh.
Impacts
The chain reaction caused heavy releases of
gamma and neutron radiation. Three workers
were exposed to doses of up to 17 Sv
(Sieverts), causing severe radiation sickness.
The worker exposed to the higest dose died
on December 21, 1999. The worker exposed
to the second highest dose of 6 - 10 Sv died
on April 27, 2000. 68 other persons were
irradiated at lower levels. Among them were
the workers who stopped the chain reaction:
they were exposed to doses of up to 119.79
mSv, exceeding the 100 mSv limit for
emergency situations. The annual dose limit
for workers is 50 mSv (while ICRP currently
recommends 20 mSv). As of October 7, 1999,
radiation levels remained high inside the plant
building, preventing inspection of the damage
inside the plant. First reports that an explosion
had blown a hole into the roof of the facility
have not been confirmed.
On November 4, 1999, the Science and
Technology Agency submitted a report to the
Nuclear Safety Commission, containing
estimates of radiation exposures during the
criticality accident, based on an analysis of
uranium solution sampled from a tank inside
the fuel processing plant and neutron levels
monitored around the plant. The report says
that the radiation dose received at a distance
of 80 meters from the accident site (that is
the nearest boundary of the plant) was
estimated at 75 mSv(this figure was revised to
30 mSv, according to Yomiuri Shimbun of
Dec. 12, 1999. Details are not known yet. )
for the first 25 minutes of the criticality
accident, and 160 mSv for the whole
criticality period of 20 hours; the radiation
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dose received at a distance of 350 meters
from the plant (that was the evacuation
boundary), was estimated at almost equal to
the annual permissible dose of 1 mSv for
the first 25 minutes, and 2 mSv for the
whole event.
Since the evacuation started only 5 hours
after the begin of the criticality, residents
may have received doses of more than 75
mSv, that is 75 times the permissible annual
dose of 1 mSv. The government has so far
said 69 people were exposed to radiation,
but the latest survey says the number of
affected people could increase.
On January 31, 2000, the Science and
Technology Agency reported that the JCO
Co. nuclear accident exposed 119 people to
levels of radiation that were higher than the
maximum dose of one millisievert,
considered safe f-11 an ordinary person to be
exposed to in a period of one year. The
agency checked radiation doses received by
207 people living within a radius of 350
meters from the accident site, 148 JCO
employees who were on its premises at the
time of the accident, 60 firefighters and
government officials who attended the
scene, and 24 JCO technicians who entered
the plant in an attempt to halt the self-
sustaining nuclear reaction of a uranium
solution. Among local residents, the highest
radiation dose recorded was 21
millisieverts. The recipient lived right next
to the plant and took a long time to
evacuate, the agency said. (Yomiuri Feb. 1,
2000)
The estimate of the total number of
persons exposed to radiation from the
accident was raised to 439. Of those
affected, 207 were local people who lived
and worked within a 350 m radius of the
plant. (Reuters Jan 31, 2000). On Oct. 14,
2000, the Science and Technology Agency
raised the number of people exposed to
radiation to 667. The number includes 229
people - passers-by, government officials
and those from new organizations - who
have newly been found to have been
exposed to radiation in the accident. Of the
229, 56 were overexposed, registering more
than 1 millisievert of radiation. One person
registered 7.2 millisieverts. (Mainichi Oct. 15,
2000).
During the accident monitoring of neutron
and gamma dose rates started only several
hours after the begin of the chain reaction.
Since recent analysis shows that about half of
the fissions occured during the first 25
minutes, the significance of such delayed
monitoring is very limited: At the boundary
of the facility, gamma dose rates of 0.84
mSv/h and neutron dose rates of 4.5 mSv/h
were recorded, while the dose limit for
members of the public is 1 mSv per year.
Two minutes after the accident, neutron
radiation levels of 0.26 micro-Sv/h, that is lO
to 100 times the normal level, were detected
at a laboratory of the Japan Atomic Energy
Research Institute in Nakamachi, located
about two kilometers from the JCO plant.
While gamma radiation is hazardous only
while it is being emitted, neutron radiation
produces new radioactive isotopes in
irradiated matter - it activates the matter.
These newly formed isotopes, such as
sodium-24 and zinc-65, continue to emit
radiation at their respective half-lives, even
after the neutron radiation has stopped. On the
one hand, this effect is a matter of concern for
the residents living nearby the plant, on the
other hand it can be used to estimate the
neutron dose rates received at such places,
where no neutron monitoring had been
performed.
Personal radiological data calculated from
whole-body counting of Na-24 is available
from STA:
• JCO workers #1-20; #21-42 : up to 23
mGy (3 most severely irradiated workers
not included)
• 3 Fire fighters: up to 3.9 mGy
• 7 Area Residents: up to 9.1 mGy
The chain reaction also produced gazeous
fission products, such as radioactive isotopes
of iodine, krypton, and xenon. These, as well
as radioactive cesium, probably have been
released into the environment. The following
is an inventory of fission products detected
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within 3 km of the accident site. The figures
were taken from newspapers and TV
reports, and have been compiled by CNIC:
• strontium-91 --- 0.021 Bq/m3 in air,
900m southeast of the site
• strontium-91 (krypton-91)
unknown amount, location not
specified
• iodine-131 54.7 Bq/kg from
mugwort ieaves, 100m from the site
• iodine-133 (krypton-91) --- unreported
amount, 100m from the site
• cesium-137 --- unreported amount, 7
locations
sodium-24 --- 64 Bq/kg, 300m west
from the site
sodium-24 --- 1.7 Bq/kg, 3km west
from the site
xenon-13 9 --- from the vomit of the
•
•
•
exposed workers
• krypton-91 --- from the vomit of the
exposed workers
The accident has been rated Level 4 on
IAEA's 7-level International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES) .
On Oct II, 1UOO, six former executives
and current employees of JCO Co. were
arrested on "SuspICIOn of negligence
resulting in two employees' deaths. lbaraki
Prefectural Police spent more than one year
investigating the nuclear accident and have
apparently concluded that JCO's systematic
rule violations and a lack of safety
measures jointly caused the disaster. lbaraki
police arrested Kenzo Koshijima, 54, who
was the head of the JCO Tokai plant where
the accident took place on Sept. 30, and
five other officials of the company.
(Mainichi Shimbun Oct. 12,2000)
Six former top officials at JCO Co.
pleaded guilty to charges of negligence
resulting in death as the trial opened into
Japan's worst nuclear accident. The pleas
were entered at the initial hearing at the
Mito District Court in lbaraki. Also, current
JCO Co. president Tomoyuki Inarni
admitted to a charge that the company
violated the nation's nuclear regulations
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law, said Mito District Court spokesman
Michiru Sakurai. (Reuters Apr 23, 2001)
Criticality accidents worldwide
A total of about 60 criticality accidents has
been reported worldwide. Most of them
occured in the 1940's to 1970's in nuclear
(weapons) research laboratories.
"In the United States there has been only one
incident in which criticality was reached at a
commercial nuclear fuel processing plant.
That occurred in 1964 at a plant, no longer in
operation, near Charlestown, Rhode Island. A
worker accidentally set off the reaction when
he poured liquid uranium into a tank and died
after being exposed to 1,000 times the lethal
dose of radiation." (San Jose Mercury News,
Oct. 1, 1999)
A near-criticality incident occured on May
28129, 1991, at General Electric's
Wilmington (North Carolina) nuclear fuel
fabrication facility. Approximately 150
kilograms of uranium were inadvertently
transferred from safe process tanks to an
unsafe tank located at the waste treatment
facility, thus creating the potential for a
localized criticality safety problem. The
excess uranium was ultimately safely
recovered when the tank contents were
centrifuged to remove
the uranium-bearing material. (for details,
see: Potential Criticality Accident at the
General Electric Nuclear Fuel and
Component Manufacturing Facility, May 29,
1991, Investigation Report, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.,
NUREG-1450, August 1991,227 p.)
.:. Minor incidents affecting criticality
safety are occuring quite often.
Recent examples:
.:. October 1, 1999: BWX Technologies
Lynchburg, Virginia
.:. August 13, 1999: Siemes Power
Corporation, Richland, Washington
.:. July 2, 1999: Portsmouth Gaseous
Diffusion Plant, Ohio
.:. May 18, 1999: BWX Technologies
Lynchburg, Virginia
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The last criticality accident reported from
the former Soviet Union occured on June
17, 1997 in the Arzamas-16 nuclear
weapons laboratory. One researcher died.
Reference
Process criticality accident likelihoods,
consequences, and emergency planning, by
T.P. McLaughlin, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, LA-UR-9l-2325, 12 p., 1991
